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ABSTRACT
Why do voters at the lower end of the socioeconomic spectrum support political candidates who
generally disfavor redistributive policies? Existing explanations often presume that voters are
explicitly acting in opposition to their economic self-interest, or that they hold persistently optimistic
expectations regarding the probability of moving into the upper ranks of the income distribution.
This paper provides an alternative economic explanation. When voters evaluate their well-being by
making relative utility comparisons, support for redistribution depends not only on absolute income
but on one' s status relative to a reference group. When reference groups are defined geographically,
support  depends  on  exposure  to  higher-income  neighbors.  The  predictions  of  the  model  are
supported by empirical evidence drawn from county-level election returns in 1980 and 2000, and by
individual-level polling data following the 2000 election.
Jacob L. Vigdor




jacob.vigdor@duke.edu[T]hose segments of the working class that have been hardest hit by the big economic 
changes of recent years are the very ones that vote Republican in the greatest numbers.
– Thomas Frank, What’s the Matter with Kansas?
If in polished countries the lowest of the people are rude and uncivil, it is not merely 
because they are poor and ignorant, but because... they are in daily contact with rich and 
enlightened men. The sight of their own hard lot and their weakness, which is daily 
contrasted with the happiness and power of some of their fellow creatures, excites in 
their hearts at the same time the sentiments of anger and of fear: the consciousness of 
their inferiority and their dependence irritates while it humiliates them...In those places 
where the rich and powerful are assembled together, the weak and the indigent feel 
themselves oppressed by their inferior condition.
– Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America [emphasis added]
1. Introduction
In the most straightforward economic model of policy-making, voters below the mean 
level of income support efforts to redistribute income, and those above the mean do not (Meltzer 
and Richard, 1981).  Moreover, increases in the variance of the income distribution should 
increase demand for redistribution (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994). 
With this model explicitly or implicitly in mind, a number of commentators have puzzled over 
the demonstrated tendency for below-average income American households to vote for national 
candidates representing the less redistributive party, even in an era of increasing inequality.
1 
Figure 1 displays basic trends associated with this puzzle: income inequality rose steadily in two 
periods during the twentieth century, in the 1920s and after 1980.  The first period witnessed a 
remarkable increase in support for the Democratic part.  While voter support for Democratic 
presidential candidates has been trending upward during the latter period, the increase is much 
less dramatic.
1Glaeser (2005) notes a similar puzzle apparent in cross-national data on income inequality and redistribution, 
which shows a negative relationship.
1The most commonly advanced explanations for the lack of a voter response to inequality 
maintain that Republican strategists have managed to make the electorate forget about their own 
economic self-interest, by focusing their attention on issues of “values” or other nonpecuniary 
matters.  Economists have also explained American apathy toward redistribution as a product of 
expectations regarding upward mobility (Benabou and Ok 2001a; Alesina and La Ferrara 2001). 
This paper proposes an alternative explanation: that the failure of rational voter models to 
explain electoral outcomes reflects not voters’ disregard for their own self-interest, but social 
scientists’ failure to correctly model it.
A growing body of empirical evidence suggests that individuals’ evaluation of their own 
well-being depends not only on their absolute level of consumption, but on their consumption 
relative to others (Frank, 1985; Tomes, 1986; Easterlin, 2001; McBride, 2001; see Frey and 
Stutzer, 2002 for a review of the economic literature on subjective valuation of well-being). 
Evidence also suggests that individuals often use geographically localized comparison groups as 
a means of gauging their relative standing (Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004; Luttmer, 2005; Stutzer, 
2004).  In a model incorporating this form of benchmarking, support for redistribution should 
covary positively with the degree of socioeconomic heterogeneity in a local area.  To the extent 
that local income distributions inform voters’ expectations regarding the likelihood that their 
own income will rise, this prediction directly opposes that of the upward-mobility-expectation 
hypothesis.
This paper develops a formal political economy model where agents vote for negative 
income tax-type proposals and utilize both absolute and relative measures of consumption to 
evaluate their well-being.  The model generates predictions for the case where voters form 
2reference groups geographically, or by comparing themselves to others of similar socioeconomic 
stature.  The paper tests the empirical predictions of this model using county-level election data 
merged to county-level Census demographic and socioeconomic data for 1980 and 2000, as well 
as individual-level polling data.  The potential for endogenous sorting of voters into communities 
with varying income profiles is addressed by isolating the transitory component of variation in 
the income distribution, which presumably drives demand for redistribution more than it 
influences sorting decisions.
Results conform with the predictions of the model.  Voters, particularly those at the low 
end of the income distribution, are more likely to support Democratic candidates when they 
reside in heterogeneous communities.  Moderate-income voters increase their support for 
redistributive candidates as their neighbors shift from low- to high-income.  There is some 
evidence that high income voters tendency to vote altruistically increases with their exposure to 
the poor.  Finally, there is some evidence that voters with an “economic reference group” 
consisting primarily of households with lower income than their own – those on the steeply 
downward-sloping portion of the income distribution – exhibit the least support for Democratic 
candidates.
Thus, while non-economic factors may hold great importance for some voters, the 
socioeconomic profile of many so-called “Red states” coincides well with the profile of 
communities expected to disfavor redistribution under the revised definition of economic self-
interest.  These states are by and large homogeneous, with neither large centers of poverty nor 
wealthy enclaves.  A large fraction of residents fall in that portion of the income distribution 
where the density of households just below them exceeds the density of households just above 
3them.  The potential utility gains from redistributive policy, particularly along the margins where 
current political debates focus, are small for this group.  These findings carry implications both 
for the design of optimal redistributive policy and for the tailoring of political messages to the 
electorate.
Section 2 reviews current and historical evidence on voting and income inequality. 
Section 3 presents a model of voter support for redistribution when utility depends on relative 
consumption.  Section 4 describes the empirical strategy and data.  Section 5 presents results, and 
Section 6 concludes.
2. Voting, Income Inequality, and Other Trends in America
Figure 1 plots the share of all voters supporting the Democratic candidate in every 
presidential election between 1896 and 2004.
2  Points in the time series are color-coded to 
signify whether the incumbent ran for re-election, and if so whether the incumbent was a 
Democrat.
3  Figure 1 also plots a basic indicator of income inequality, taken from Piketty and 
Saez (2003): the share of income earned by individuals above the 90
th percentile in the income 
distribution.  There are several noteworthy patterns in the graph.  First, majority support for the 
Democratic party is rare.  Of the twenty-eight elections plotted, the Democratic candidate 
received a majority of votes cast six times.
4
Four of the six instances where Democrats earned a majority of votes are associated with 
2 Note that it is traditional in studies of voting patterns to restrict attention to one party’s share of the two-party vote 
(e.g. Fair, 2002).  This figure thus highlights the relative importance of third party candidates in certain elections, 
such as 1992 when Ross Perot garnered a substantial share of the vote.  
3 Incumbents generally have a strong advantage over challengers in elections.  For an exploration of this 
phenomenon, see Lee (2001).
4 By contrast, the Republican candidate received an absolute majority in fourteen of the twenty-eight elections.  The 
Democratic candidate was victorious in six of the eight elections where neither party’s candidate earned an absolute 
majority – the exceptions being 2000 and 2004.
4a single candidate, Franklin Roosevelt.  Roosevelt’s initial election in 1932 marked a tremendous 
reversal of fortune for the party, which had received less than one-third of the popular vote just 
eight years before.
5  As the time series show, this reversal of fortune followed upon the heels of a 
noticeable increase in income inequality.  Roosevelt’s election is often attributed to the onset of 
the Great Depression, but note that income inequality remained at an elevated level through the 
Depression, declining only after the nation’s entry into World War II.
Democratic candidates’ success against Republican incumbents effectively reverted to 
pre-Roosevelt era between 1956 and 1984, a period marked by relatively low and stable degrees 
of income inequality.
6  In the last two decades of the century, the share of income accruing to the 
top decile rose again, and the time trend suggests a slight upward trend in support for Democratic 
candidates, evident particularly when comparing elections with the same incumbency pattern. 
Compared to the Roosevelt groundswell, however, this upward trend appears rather anemic.  The 
absence of a stronger move towards Democratic candidates in the face of growing inequality has 
drawn both academic and popular attention, and is the puzzle at the heart of this paper.
There are several more pieces to this puzzle.  Figure 2 depicts a scatterplot relating 
county-level voter support for the Democrat candidate, Al Gore, in the 2000 election to median 
income in 1999, as reported in the 2000 Census.  Traditional political economy models would 
suggest a negative relationship between these two variables: counties with more poor residents 
should display greater support for the candidate associated with stronger redistributive policies. 
Instead, the correlation is modestly positive, as indicated by the least-squares regression line.
7
5 A third party candidate, Robert LaFollette, received one-sixth of the popular vote in 1924.
6 The exception to this pattern is Carter’s election in 1976, which marked the first election after the Watergate 
scandal and the first election where the incumbent was elected neither to the presidency or the vice presidency.
7 The regression line in Figure 2 reflects an unweighted least-squares specification.  Weighting observations by 
2000 population, or by the number of votes cast in the 2000 election, produces very similar results.
5Another widely noted political phenomenon of the past half-century is the transformation 
of the deep South from a solidly Democratic to solidly Republican region.  Democratic candidate 
Adlai Stevenson received electoral votes from nine states in 1952; John Kerry won twenty states 
in 2004.  The set of states won by both candidates in their respective elections is empty. 
Traditional explanations for the conversion of the South focus on the Democratic party’s 
association with the Civil Rights movement, or with Republican attempts to court socially 
conservative voters with essentially non-economic policy positions.
A commonly stated hypothesis for the relatively weak support for redistributive policy in 
the United States focuses on voters’ perceptions of the prospects for upward mobility (Alesina 
and La Ferrara, 2001; Benabou and Ok, 2001a; Benabou and Tirole 2005).  The weak voter 
response to income inequality since 1980 might then be explained by a contemporaneous 
increase in income mobility, or a change in voter perceptions of the potential future benefits of 
inequality.  Available evidence is not supportive of either trend.  Benabou and Ok (2001b), 
studying income mobility in the PSID, find little evidence of a structural change in mobility 
patterns between the 1980s and 1990s.  Evidence on attitudes towards inequality, collected by 
the General Social Survey and summarized in Figure 3, show that Americans generally adopted 
less favorable attitudes towards income inequality between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s.  The 
proportion of respondents answering “disagree” or “strongly disagree” to the statement “large 
differences in income are necessary for America’s prosperity” increased from 37% in the earlier 
period to 58% in the later period.
8  Evidence presented below also argues against the upward-
mobility-expectation hypothesis, unless voter expectations of mobility covary negatively with 
8  A similar shift in opinions can be seen in responses to the query “It is the responsibility of the government to 
reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes.”  In the mid-
1980s, half of all respondents either disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement.  In the 1996 survey, this 
proportion declined to 43%.
6heterogeneity in the local income distribution.  
Finally, the increase in income inequality in the later part of the century was 
accompanied, at least through 1990, by an increase in the economic segregation of the nation’s 
cities and metropolitan areas (Jargowsky, 1995).  While measurement problems render it difficult 
to identify the trend in economic segregation prior to 1970, the principal demographic trend 
associated with this increase – suburbanization – can be traced back to much earlier points in 
time (Jackson, 1985).  The tendency for voters to reside in increasingly homogeneous 
communities thus may have reduced the particular effect of inequality noted by Tocqueville in 
the passage quoted above, by leading them into less frequent contact with “rich and enlightened 
men.”
The interconnections between these various trends and observations are made in the 
following section.
3. Who Supports Redistribution if Relative Consumption Matters?
Previous research in public economic theory has established that when consumer welfare 
depends at least to some extent on relative rather than absolute consumption, optimal tax and 
transfer policies are more redistributive (Boskin and Sheshinski, 1978), optimal levels of public 
good expenditures exceed the standard Samuelsonian level (Ng, 1987), and optimal fiscal 
policies should be more countercyclical (Ljungqvist and Uhlig, 2000).  Comparatively less 
attention has been paid to the topic of voter behavior in this scenario.  This section  uses a basic 
negative income tax model to analyze the effect of relative income comparsion on voters' support 
for redistribution.  With this conceptual framework, it is possible to link together and explain 
7many of the phenomena reported in the preceding section.
As in Boskin and Sheshinski (1978), suppose that voters derive earn income y as a 
function of their own (exogenous) ability n and an educational input x.  The cost of acquiring x is 
an increasing and concave function g(x).  For simplicity, assume that y(n,x)=nx and g(x)=x
2. 
Voters are responsible for choosing a negative income tax policy that produces net-of-transfer-
and-educational-investment income y':
(1) y'= y−gx ,
which, substituting for y and g(x), can be expressed as
(2)  y'=n x−x
2 .
In a model where only absolute consumption enters the utility function, the median voter 
will select values of α, β, and x that maximize her net-of-transfer-and-education-investment 
income subject to the balanced-budget constraint:
(3)  I =∑
i
ni xi ,
where i indexes the I individuals in the economy, and each individual xi is presumed to be chosen 
optimally given β.  In this framework, it is relatively straightforward to solve for the optimal 
educational investment x.  The first order condition is:
(4)  n−2x=0 ,
which yields an optimal value for x as 
n
2
.  Substituting this solution into the balanced-
budget constraint (3) and the objective function (2), and then solving (3) for α and substituting 













8First-order conditions provide the following solution for a voter's optimal choice of β:
















Table 1 presents some simple results using this formulation.  In a three-voter economy with 
ability levels {0,0,1}, the median voter sets  β=1/2.  In an economy with ability levels {0,1,1}, 
second order conditions for a maximum do not hold, so the median voter selects the corner 
solution  β=1.  These results are quite intuitive: when the median voter is below the mean 
income, tax rates are set at a relatively high level, and when the median voter is above the mean 
income, tax rates are set to zero.  The third row of Table 1 presents the case where ability levels 
are {0,1,2}.  In this case, the median voter selects an intermediate value for  β of 5/7.
10
As a straightforward way of introducing relative consumption into the model, suppose 
that utility is a simple linear function of own consumption and that of a reference person. 
Consumption of the reference person enters negatively, with a weight 0≤γ≤1.  When  γ=0, 
relative consumption is not a concern.  When  γ=1, the impact of the reference person's 
consumption on utility is equal and opposite to the effect of own consumption.
11  Denoting a 
voter's own ability as nj and the reference person's as nk, the single-variable objective function (5) 
can be rewritten as:
9 Note that second-order conditions require that the denominator be positive for this solution to maximize the 
objective function.  An example of a situation where second-order conditions do not hold, and the solution in that 
case, are discussed below.
10 In this case, note that the median voter ends up with a pre-transfer income below the mean, in spite of the fact 
that her ability level equals the mean.










































As expected, when  γ=0 this reduces to (6).  When  γ=1, second-order conditions for a 
maximum do not hold , leading to consequences described in more detail below.  At intermediate 
levels of  γ, this altered formula yields the tax rate most preferred by each voter.
The remaining rows of Table 1 illustrate how a voter's preferred level of  β varies with 
her own ability level, the reference person's ability level, and the extent to which relative rather 
than absolute consumption matters for utility.  In a three-voter economy with voter ability levels 
{0,0,1}, the median voter's choice of β now depends on the value of  γ and the identity of the 
reference person.  If the median voter refers to the other voter with ability level 0, the original 
preferred net-of-tax rate  β=1/2 is chosen at the minimum and any intermediate level of  γ.  When 
γ=1, second order conditions fail to hold, and the voter becomes exactly indifferent between any 
and all values of  β.
When the reference person is the individual with ability level 1, the median voter 
continues to choose  β=1/2 when relative comparisons do not matter, but reduces the value – 
increasing the implied marginal tax rate – as interpersonal comparisons increase in importance. 
At  γ=1/2, the preferred  β=1/5, and at  γ=1, the preferred  β=0.  Intuitively, when the median 
voter compares herself to the higher-ability consumer, an additional benefit from selecting high 
10tax rates comes into play, as the reduction in the income of the high-ability consumer raises 
utility directly.
Finally, note that the high-ability consumer always prefers the zero-redistribution  β=1, 
since the addition of interpersonal comparisons only increases the incentive to avoid transferring 
income to others.
In the three-voter economy with ability levels {0,1,2} and γ=1/2, the median voter 
chooses β=5/16 when the reference person is the high-ability consumer.  Note that this net-of-tax 
rate is considerably smaller than in the model where only absolute consumption matters.
12  When 
the reference person is the low-ability consumer, the median voter chooses the no-redistribution 
outcome β=1.  Even though the median voter's absolute consumption level stands to increase 
with a redistribution scheme, the greater benefits enjoyed by the low-ability consumer lead to a 
reduction in overall utility.
Overall, the model yields the following insights:
• Low-ability voters who care about relative consumption will favor stronger redistribution 
as the ability level of their reference group increases.
• Moderate-ability voters who care about relative consumption will favor stronger 
redistribution when their reference group is of higher ability, and weaker redistribution 
when their reference group is of lower ability.
• As interpersonal comparisons become more important to utility, the relative position of 
the voter and the reference group become more critical determinants of preferences for 
redistribution.  In the extreme, when γ=1, voters with ability levels above the reference 
group favor state confiscation of all resources, voters with ability levels below the 
12 Were the median voter to compare herself with another individual with n=1, the preferred  β would be 5/7, 
11reference group favor zero redistribution, and voters with ability levels exactly equal to 
their reference group are exactly indifferent between any policy alternatives.
Introducing altruism
While the model above posits that support for redistribution is driven primarily by self 
interest, there is also ample evidence that voters behave altruistically toward the poor, albeit 
often in a selective manner (Luttmer 2001).  Altruistic behavior can be introduced 
straightforwardly into the model above, by allowing the weight on others' consumption in the 
utility function,  γ, to be negative, and setting the reference person to be the poorest in the 
group.
13  It is straightforward to show that when  γ is sufficiently negative, voters select tax rates 
higher than they would in the absence of interpersonal comparisons.  Moreover, median voters 
acting on altruistic preferences select higher tax rates as the reference person's ability declines.
14
A note on rank-order models
When voters care about their rank in the income distribution, as in Layard (1980), the 
introduction of relative consumption concerns into a negative income tax framework is 
inherently uninteresting, as such a policy cannot influence rank orderings.  Voters will continue 
to base their support for redistribution on its effects on their absolute level of consumption.
Two reasonable extensions of the above model could allow for rank-order concerns to 
influence support for redistribution.  First, the introduction of redistributive programs with 
discrete eligibility cutoffs introduce the possibility of reversing some rankings in the income 
13 This extension need not imply that high-income voters act purely out of altruistic care for the poor.  Appeasement 
in the classic Marxist sense could lead to very similar behavior.
14 As an example, consider communities with composition {0,2,2} and {1,2,2} when  γ=-3.  In the former case, the 
median voter selects β=15/19, and in the latter case  β=33/35.
12distribution, or at the very least compressing the rankings.
15  This sort of program would receive 
relatively low support from those who expect to fall just above the eligibility threshold.
Second, suppose income in future periods is uncertain and follows a random walk, with 
period-to-period innovations based on mean-zero independently distributed shocks, and that 
voters are at least somewhat risk averse.  If a voter's net transfer payment in period t is realized 
before the shock to income in that period, then a negative income tax may increase the likelihood 
of a rank reduction.
16
Defining a reference group
If voters determine their support for redistributive policy in part by gauging the impact it 
would have on themselves relative to a reference group, the selection of reference groups by 
individual voters plays a critical role in determining the total amount of redistribution in the 
economy.  As noted above, recent empirical evidence is consistent with the notion that 
geography plays a strong role in reference groups (Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004; Luttmer, 2005; 
Stutzer, 2004).  When reference groups are geographic in nature, the model presented here 
suggests that support for redistribution among the poor should be highest when the poor share 
neighborhoods or regions with the wealthy.  If the wealthy exhibit altruism of the sort discussed 
above, then their support for redistribution should likewise increase with their exposure to the 
poor.  Poor or altruistic wealthy voters who live in homogeneous communities should exhibit the 
least support for redistribution conditional on income.  Middle-income voters should support 
15 It is not uncommon for transfer programs to involve these types of discrete changes in benefits.  For a discussion 
of the economic implications, see Yelowitz (1995). 
16 While this particular ordering of events may seem unintuitive, it could be compared to the awarding of tax 
refunds for year t-1 roughly one-third of the way through year t, or to the awarding of ex post tax rebates such as 
those enacted twice in the United States since 2001 (Shapiro and Slemrod, 2003).
13redistribution when they share communities with the wealthy, but oppose it when they reside in 
close proximity to the poor (unless they too exhibit altruism).  These implications of the use of 
geographic reference groups, coupled with the tendency toward greater economic segregation 
noted in section 2 above, provides one possible explanation for the failure of increasing 
inequality to inspire stronger support for redistribution among low-to-moderate income voters.
Voters may use factors other than geographic proximity to form reference groups.  One 
possibility is that voters evaluate their well-being by comparing themselves to those of 
comparable socioeconomic status, defined by occupation, education level, or income itself.  In 
such a case, the key to support for redistribution may lie in the shape of the probability density 
function of the income distribution.  Suppose individuals' reference groups consist of those 
households with income within a finite range of their own.  On the upward sloping portion of the 
income distribution, mean income within reference groups tends to be higher than the voter's 
own income.  On the downward sloping portion, the opposite is true.  On relatively flat portions, 
reference group means tend to be close to the voter's own income.
Figure 4 summarizes these predictions, utilizing an income distribution graph that bears 
much resemblance to the actual distribution in the United States in recent decades.  Perhaps the 
most noteworthy prediction here is that opposition to redistribution will actually be stronger 
amongst those on the steeply downward sloping portion of the income distribution than among 
those in the comparatively flat upper tail.
How does this framework link the economic and political trends observed during the 
twentieth century?  First, the sorting of Americans into more economically homogeneous 
communities over time should have the effect of blunting the impact of income inequality on 
14support for redistribution.  To the extent that counties with higher median incomes have greater 
income heterogeneity, a cross-sectional relationship such as that plotted in Figure 2 is to be 
expected.
Second, changes in the shape of the American income distribution have placed a higher 
fraction of the population in a situation where there exists a greater mass of households 
immediately below them relative to above them.  Figure 5 displays kernel density plots of the 
family income distribution in  the United States, based on decennial Census data, for 1940, 1960, 
1980 and 2000.
17  Relative to the plots in the first three years, the income distribution in 2000 
features a much higher peak and considerably less mass in the upper tail.  The majority of voters 
now find themselves on a relatively steep downward-sloping portion of the income distribution, 
in marked contrast to earlier decades.
Finally, this framework can provide an explanation for the transference of Southern 
political allegiance from the Democratic to Republican side with one additional assumption.  In 
the era of legal segregation, the reference groups of relatively poor white voters may have 
consisted only of other whites.  Along with ending most forms of legally enforceable racial 
segregation, Civil Rights-era legislation may have changed the perceptions of these poor white 
voters, leading them to consider African-Americans as part of their reference group.  The model 
presented in this section clearly predicts that the emergence of a new low-income reference 
group should reduce support for redistribution among those of moderate income, so long as those 
moderate income voters do not harbor altruistic sentiments toward the low-income group.
17 The kernel densities omit families in the top 1% of the income distribution, which are often topcoded, and those 
with negative or zero income.  Densities have been rescaled to provide common support – the plots for years 
earlier than 2000 should not be construed to represent income in 2000 dollars.
154. Data and Methods
The model outlined above promotes several testable implications.  To the extent that 
voters use relative consumption comparisons to judge their own well-being, and compare 
themselves to those in close geographic proximity, then low-income voters will show greater 
support in heterogeneous rather than homogeneous communities.  Moderate-income voters will 
show greater support when they share communities with wealthier neighbors, unless they are 
highly altruistic.  High-income voters, to the extent they are altruistic, will show greater support 
in heterogeneous communities.  To the extent that voters compare themselves to households of 
similar socioeconomic status, rather than those in close proximity, support for redistribution 
should follow the pattern outlined in Figure 4.
The empirical tests reported in this paper make use of two data sources.  The first is 
voting data geographically aggregated to the county level, matched with county-level 
demographic data derived from the US Census.  Analyses using aggregated data are performed 
using the last two presidential elections that coincided with Census enumerations, 1980 and 
2000.  The second data source is derived from two post-election polls conducted jointly by CBS 
News and the New York Times in late November and mid-December 2000.  Individual poll 
responses, including the candidate voted for in the 2000 election, income, and other items, are 
merged with county-level statistics on income and other indicators.
When using individual-level data, the theoretical model described in the preceding 
section can be operationalized as follows:




where the outcome variable Yijk represents support for a Democrat, Xijk is a vector characteristics 
16for individual i belonging to group j in community k, Zk is a vector of community characteristics, 
and smk represents the share of individuals in community k who belong to group m.  The intercept 
parameter αj may take on different values for members of different groups.  The parameter δjm 
measures the change in voting patterns associated with a shift in the composition of the 
population away from the omitted group category  and into group  m∈[2,J ] .  Specifications 
presented below will frequently impose constraints on the J(J-1) different parameters δjm.
Following the logic of Vigdor (2002) and Vigdor (2004), equation (9) when aggregated 
across individuals produces the following equation for the average probability of support for a 










 jm smk s jk .
Equation (10) makes clear that it is impossible to identify the full set of coefficients  δjm  without 
imposing further parameter restrictions, as smksjk = sjksmk.  An additional set of parameter 
restrictions is required to avoid collinearity, since the sjk sum to one.  One relatively 
straightforward restriction is to presume that voters are influenced primarily by the share of their 
own group in the population.  With this restriction, equation (10) can be rewritten as the 
following:
(11)  PrY k=1=∑
j=1
J
 js jk  X ijkZ k∑
j=1
J
 j s jk
2 .
With the additional assumption that the parameters δj are equal across groups, assuming a 
common value δ, the equation takes the form
(12)  PrY k=1=∑
j=1
J





17In this equation, the parameter δ is the coefficient on a Herfindahl-like index of income 
homogeneity.  In completely homogeneous communities, this variable takes on the value of one. 
As communities become more heterogeneous, this variable takes on values closer to zero.
The assumptions associated with moving from equation (10) to equation (12), though 
straightforward, are not necessarily well aligned with theoretical predictions.  Theory suggests, 
for example, that moderate-income voters will respond differently to increases in the low-income 
and high-income shares of the population.  Equations (11) and (12) do not permit such a 
heterogeneous response.  It is also quite possible that low income voters' response to increased 
income heterogeneity, rooted in decreased utility from interpersonal comparisons, is not of the 
same magnitude as high income voters' response, which would be rooted in altruism.  Equation 
(11) allows these differential responses, while equation (12) does not.  Empirical specifications 
reported below will offer some versions of each of the above equations, with constraints 
motivated by the theoretical discussion above applied to equation (10).
Aggregated regressions, as well as some individual-level regressions, control for a 
number of community characteristics.  Controls for racial composition will capture the 
established tendency for minority voters to support Democratic candidates.  The racial group 
shares will also be combined into a racial homogeneity index.  Under assumptions analogous to 
those described above, the coefficient on this index describes the typical voter's response to a 
decrease in her group’s share of the population.
Several covariates aim to capture the character of the community.  Controls for the 
percent of the population residing in urban areas proxy for the community’s density, while 
possibly addressing specific policy concerns in rural areas such as access to government-owned 
18land.  Controls for the percent of housing units built within the past decade, home ownership 
rates, and the fraction of households who have lived in the same house for at least five years, will 
capture the relative stability of the local population.  Finally, specifications control for the 
percent of residents who work as government employees, and as active-duty members of the 
armed forces.  Summary statistics for county-level regression covariates appear in Table 2.
Individual-level regressions, in addition to controlling for some community-level average 
characteristics, utilize covariates derived from the CBS/New York Times poll data.  These 
variables include categorical controls for educational attainment, race, marital status, whether 
children are present in the respondent's household, and gender.  The basic hypotheses outlined 
above are tested with intervalled data by matching respondent's (intervalled) income reports to 
Census data on the share of households with similar, higher, and lower incomes in the same 
county.  Summary statistics for these individual-level variables appear in Table 3.
The potential for non-random sorting of individuals into communities of varying 
heterogeneity is a serious concern for this analysis.  Rather than reflect the impact of community-
level variables on voting patterns, the estimates might merely reveal the tendency for individuals 
who care for those in different income brackets to also choose locations in proximity to such 
individuals.
18
The strategy employed below to address this concern rests on two assumptions.  First, to 
the extent that households choose communities on the basis of income heterogeneity, they are 
more concerned with permanent rather than transitory variation.  Second, households’ attitudes 
towards redistribution are driven by both permanent and transitory variation in their 
18 Basic evidence that this is not the case can be derived from Rhode and Strumpf’s (2003) finding that within-
community heterogeneity has increased steadily over the past century or more.  If such a movement reflected 
stronger preferences for redistribution, one would expect it to be accompanied by increasing vote shares for political 
parties favoring redistribution.  As Figure 1 shows, this is clearly not the case.
19community’s income distribution.
19  Under these assumptions, selection effects will be associated 
primarily with permanent variation in income heterogeneity, while treatment effects will 
associate with both permanent and transitory variation.  In some specifications, then, I will 
employ a measure of “transitory” income heterogeneity: that portion of income heterogeneity 
within a county that is orthogonal to lagged measures of the same variable.
5. Results
Table 4 presents baseline regression results employing 2000 county-level voting data 
merged to socioeconomic and demographic data from the 2000 Census.  The first specification 
reported is a basic bivariate model, revealing the strength of the unconditional linear relationship 
between the income homogeneity index and Al Gore’s share of the two-party presidential vote.
20 
The relationship is negative and statistically significant, explaining about 1% of the underlying 
variation in Gore’s share.  The magnitude of the coefficient suggests that a one-standard 
deviation increase in homogeneity predicts a 1.5 percentage point, or one-tenth standard 
deviation, drop in support for the Democratic candidate.  Applying the behavioral interpretation 
discussed above, a percentage point increase in an individual’s own income group share is 
associated with a 1.9 percentage point decline in the probability of supporting Gore.
Referring to equation (12), the first estimated regression imposes the assumption that all 
income categories have the same baseline propensity to vote for Gore (same value of α). 
Controlling for group shares, as in the second specification, relaxes this assumption.  The 
magnitude of the estimated coefficient on the homogeneity index increases substantially in this 
19 Empirical evidence suggests that individuals do respond positively to transitory income shocks suffered by 
members of their community.  See, for example, Hungerman (forthcoming).
20 In contrast to Figure 1, which used national-level data on the Democrat’s share of all votes, these specifications 
show Gore’s share of the two-party vote, primarily because of cross-state variation in the number of third-party 
candidates on the ballot.
20specification.  A standard deviation increase in homogeneity now predicts a 5 percentage point 
drop in support for Gore.
The third specification incorporates the county-level covariates described in the 
preceding section.  Here, the estimated impact of income homogeneity largely reverts to its 
initial level.  A number of included covariates show significant relationships with voting 
patterns.  Almost universally, higher nonwhite shares predict greater support for the Democratic 
party.  Racial heterogeneity, by contrast, predicts less support.  This pattern can be given an 
interpretation analogous to that motivated by equation (12) above: nonwhite groups show 
evidence of a greater propensity to support redistribution, but all groups’ support increases when 
their share of the population increases.  This pattern is consistent with Luttmer’s (2001) finding 
that support for welfare spending increases when local welfare recipients are drawn 
disproportionately from one’s own racial category.
Communities that are more highly urbanized, slower-growing, with fewer homeowners 
and fewer single-family detached housing units are more likely to support the Democratic party. 
One possible explanation for this finding is that older, denser urban communities are more likely 
to bring the rich and poor in close contact with one another.  This possibility will be evaluated 
below.
Controlling for income, race, and community characteristics, there are few significant 
associations between a county’s employment distribution and voting patterns.  The principal 
exception to this concerns individuals on active duty military: counties with a significant military 
presence are more likely to vote Republican.
In addition to predictions regarding the impact of county-level income homogeneity, the 
21model outlined in section 3 suggested a potentially nonlinear relationship between household 
income and support for redistribution.  This prediction could be tested using the coefficients on 
the various income category variables included in the second and third regressions in Table 2.  In 
practice, the coefficients on these fifteen variables are imprecisely estimated, perhaps because 
they are jointly highly correlated.  Rather than report these coefficients, the fourth regression in 
Table 2 collapses income categories into three.  The first category, those with incomes below 
$25,000 per year in 1999, corresponds to the group on the upward-sloping portion of the 1999 
income distribution, as evident in Figure 5, which is drawn from Census microdata.  The second 
category, those with incomes below $25,000 and $75,000, identifies households on the steeply 
sloped portion of the income distribution.  Those with incomes above $75,000 are considered to 
be in the tail of the distribution, and form the omitted category in Table 4.
The fourth regression indeed shows a nonlinear relationship between income and support 
for redistribution.  Adopting the behavioral interpretation outlined in the preceding section, it 
implies that the highest income group has the greatest propensity to vote for Democrats, 
followed by the lowest group.  The group on the steep portion of the income distribution, as 
predicted, shows the greatest evidence of opposition to redistribution.  Collapsing the fifteen 
income categories into three has only a modest impact on the model’s fit, as indicated by the R-
squared statistic.  This specification change also has the impact of reducing the estimated 
relationship between income homogeneity and support for Al Gore.  A one-standard deviation 
increase in homogeneity now predicts a 0.8 percentage point decline in support.  In this 
specification, civilian government employees appear as a significant positive predictor of support 
for the Democratic party.
22The final specification in Table 4 introduces state fixed effects, which force the 
remainder of the coefficients in the model to be identified on the basis of within-state variation. 
While allowing state-specific intercepts appreciably improves the model’s fit, impact on most 
estimated coefficients is relatively unremarkable.  This model does, however, estimate a 
relationship between income and support for Al Gore more consistent with the prediction offered 
above: low-income voters now show the highest propensity to support the Democratic candidate, 
followed by high-income voters.  Including state fixed effects leads to a slight strengthening of 
the estimated relationship between income homogeneity and opposition to the Democratic party.
The impact of income homogeneity on voting need not be uniform across all 
communities or among all types of voters.  In sparsely populated areas, heterogeneity in the 
income distribution may be insufficient to guarantee frequent contact between individuals from 
different points in the socioeconomic spectrum, implying that county-level measures of 
heterogeneity poorly reflect the composition of an individual's reference group.  Moreover, the 
model above indicates that moderate income voters will react differently to increases in the share 
of high and low income voters, and more generally that the reaction to heterogeneity can differ 
among voters with different incomes.  Table 5 offers evidence on these hypothesized sources of 
heterogeneity in the effect of homogeneity.
The first specification in Table 5 shows that the effect of income homogeneity is 
essentially zero in completely rural counties.  The link between the income distribution and 
voting patterns is strongest in urban areas, consistent with the notion that rural environments are 
not conducive to the creation of geographically-based reference groups, at least when counties 
serve as the relevant geographic unit.
23The second regression estimates a version of equation (11) above, rather than equation 
(12).  Following the interpretation outlined above, the individual controls for squared group 
share terms allows the impact of a percentage point increase in group share on that group’s 
propensity to support Al Gore to vary across groups.  The controls on the linear group share 
terms reveal groups’ baseline propensity to support that candidate.  Consistent with predictions 
and earlier results, the middle-income group representing the steeply downward sloping portion 
of the income distribution continues to display the least support for the redistributive party.  The 
sensitivity of voter support to group share varies considerably across groups.  Evidence suggests 
that both low-income and high-income voters become less likely to support redistribution as their 
share of the county population increases.  The opposite pattern emerges for the middle income 
group – as their share of the population increases, they become more likely to support 
redistribution.  This would be expected if the primary source of variation in the middle group's 
share is changes in the proportion in the low income group.
The final specification in Table 5 estimates a version of equation (10), imposing several 
parameter constraints: adopting the behavioral interpretation of coefficients, these constraints 
imply that low-income voters do not distinguish between middle and high income groups, and 
that high income voters do not vary their behavior with the income composition of their local 
area.  This last constraint effectively rules out altruism as a motivation for the voting patterns of 
the wealthy.  Relative to the prior specification, then, the constraint that has been relaxed is the 
one restricting moderate income voters to respond equally to increases in the high and low 
income shares of the population.  This constraint is clearly inconsistent with the model presented 
in Section 3, and results clearly show a significant difference.  In the place of the squared middle 
24income group share, the specification introduces interactions between middle and low group 
shares, and between middle and high group shares.  
Under the various assumptions underlying a behavioral interpretation of these results, 
moderate income voters are significantly less likely to support the redistributive party as the 
share of low income voters increases in their county.  Shifts between the moderate and high 
income categories have no significant impact on the voting behavior of the middle income group. 
Note also that evidence suggests that low income voters continue to support redistributive 
candidates most fervently when they form a small share of the population.
To this point, analysis has treated the degree of income homogeneity in a county as an 
exogenous feature to which voters respond.  This is obviously not the most accurate 
conceptualization of the variable.  Rather, income homogeneity is determined in part by a 
process of household spatial sorting, which may lead individuals with greater distaste for 
members of other groups to both sort into homogeneous areas and vote against candidates 
associated with policies that imply the sharing of resources across groups.  In this scenario, 
exogenously changing the degree of heterogeneity in any one area would not necessarily lead to 
any change in voting behavior.
Some of the variation in income homogeneity across counties is driven by transient, 
idiosyncratic factors: manufacturing plant shutdowns, corporate restructurings and the like. 
Under the presumption that household sorting processes are unlikely to respond to these transient 
sources of variation, estimates based on this source of variation have the potential to circumvent 
any bias associated with endogenous sorting processes.  To implement this strategy, income 
homogeneity data for 1980 and 2000 were merged into a single dataset, and the following 
25regression equation was estimated:
Income homogeneity2000 =   0.073     + 0.145*Income homogeneity1980
(0.001)  (0.007)
The regression equation has 3,116 observations; the raw correlation between the two variables is 
0.34.  Residuals from this regression are then employed as measures of the degree of income 
homogeneity that appears transitory, rather than permanent, in nature.  
Table 6 reports coefficients of regression models identical to the ones reported in Table 4, 
except the standard measure of homogeneity is replaced with this residual measure.  Across 
specifications, the coefficient on this measure is slightly closer to zero than the equivalent 
coefficient in Table 4.  This pattern is consistent with the notion that endogenous sorting of more 
generous individuals into more diverse areas biases coefficients away from zero.  The magnitude 
of the bias, at least as revealed by this procedure, is relatively small.  Consider the coefficient 
estimates in the final columns of both tables.  While the original parameter estimate suggests that 
a standard deviation increase in homogeneity leads to a 0.9 percentage point decrease in support 
for Gore, this corrected version implies an effect of 0.7 percentage points.  The variation in 
parameter estimates is well within one standard error.
The estimates presented in preceding tables can be used to infer patterns in individual 
behavior only under a set of assumptions: that individual voters' propensity to support 
Democratic candidates is a linear function of group shares, and that the slope coefficients 
describing this relationship obey a number of parameter restrictions.  As a check on these 
assumptions, Table 7 presents the results of linear probability model regression specifications 
that utilize individual-level data, rather than geographic aggregates.
21  The primary advantage of 
21 Probit specifications produce qualitatively similar results.  The linear models are presented for ease of 
interpretation and comparability with the aggregated results above.
26individual data is that they permit an assessment of whether aggregation bias severely 
contaminates the estimates derived in county-level regressions. The primary drawback of these 
analyses is small sample size: only two voter polls conducted in 2000 recorded information on 
the candidate supported by the respondent in the presidential election, respondent's income, and 
respondent's county of residence.  The estimation sample used in Table 7 pools these two polls.
The first specification utilizes only three control variables: indicators for whether 
respondents fell into two of three basic income categories available in the poll data (between 
$30,000 and $75,000, and over $75,000), and a county-level control for the share of residents in 
the respondent's county who belonged to the same income group.
22  Results indicate a monotonic 
negative relationship between income category and the propensity to vote for Al Gore. 
Controlling for income category, individuals who reside in counties where a higher proportion of 
households fall into their income category are significantly less likely to support the Democratic 
candidate.  Adopting a behavioral interpretation, the results suggest that a one-percentage-point 
increase in group share produces an 0.47 percentage point reduction in the probability of voting 
for Gore.  A one-standard deviation increase in this measure predicts a 4.7 percentage point drop 
in this probability.  Thus while from a behavioral perspective this coefficient appears smaller 
than the analogous estimates derived from county-level specifications, the effect size as 
traditionally measured is considerably larger here.
23
The second specification in Table 7 controls for the share of voters in higher and lower 
income categories, relative to the respondent.  Holding voters' own income category constant, 
22 The original polling data report income in five categories; they have been collapsed here in a manner that most 
closely matches the categorizations used in the county-level regressions.  Standard errors in these specifications 
have been adjusted for clustering at the county/income category level.  The 1,278 individuals included in the 
sample belong to 901 different clusters.
23 From a behavioral perspective, the inequality of results could also be explained by the use of different income 
cagetory definitions in the individual-level and geographically aggregated specifications.
27support for Al Gore increases significantly with the share of households in higher income 
categories.  Using a behavioral interpretation, increasing the share of the population with higher 
incomes by 1 percentage point increases the probability of voting for Gore by 0.66 percentage 
points.  There is also a positive coefficient on the share of households in lower income 
categories, consistent with altruistic motives for some voters, though that estimate is not 
significantly different from zero.  Comparing the coefficients on the lower and higher income 
share variables shows the impact for moderate-income voters of switching neighbors directly 
from the lower to higher income category.  As expected, the greater magnitude of the high-
income-share coefficient implies that support for redistribution increases in that scenario.  Note 
that with these two controls in place, the coefficients on income category indicators become 
indistinguishable from zero.
The last two specifications in Table 7 introduce growing numbers of additional covariates 
into the specification.  These additional covariates are sufficient to eliminate the statistical 
significance of the income share variables, though point estimates continue to suggest that voters 
become more favorably disposed toward redistribution as their neighbors become richer.  The 
individual-level covariates produce largely intuitive effects: support for the Democratic party is 
strongest among the less educated, racial minorities, the childless, women, and the divorced or 
never-married.  Upon introducing the community-level characteristics employed in Table 4, the 
coefficient on the share-of-population-with-lower income variable becomes negative and 
insignificant, and the coefficient on the share-of-population-with-higher income is reduced to 
half its initial magnitude, with a t-statistic of roughly 1.5.  In the end, the individual-level data 
produces results fully consistent with the theoretical model, and effect sizes that are substantial 
28from an absolute perspective.  The ultimate lack of statistical significance, however, does limit 
the corroborative value of these results.
The presidential election of 2000 was in many respects highly unusual.  Can these results 
be generalized to a more “typical” election?  Table 8 reports the results of regression 
specifications identical to those in Table 4, using county-level voting data from the 1980 election 
matched to Census socioeconomic and demographic information from that year.  Whereas the 
2000 election was unbearably close, the 1980 election was something of a landslide, with Ronald 
Reagan winning election with a margin of nearly ten percentage points.  Democratic candidate 
Jimmy Carter won electoral votes from only five states, three of which lie below the Mason-
Dixon line.
24  Although the elections of 1980 and 2000 were won by candidates from the same 
party, in other respects they present mark contrasts with one another.
The results reveal important differences in patterns of support for Carter and Gore in 
elections separated by twenty years.  Carter enjoyed comparatively weaker support in counties 
with sizable nonwhite populations and stronger support in counties with a large share of 
manufacturing employment.  Racially homogeneous counties tended to side with Gore but 
against Carter.  Sixteen years before a Democratic president declared an end to the “era of big 
government,” government employees showed much stronger support for Carter, relative to the 
support shown to Gore two decades later.
In contrast to these striking differences, the effect of income homogeneity on support for 
Carter is significant and negative in all specifications except the simple bivariate model.  While 
coefficient magnitudes are generally reduced relative to their counterparts in Table 4, it should 
be noted that the standard deviation of the income homogeneity index is significantly larger in 
24 Carter also won electoral votes from the District of Columbia.
29the 1980 data.  A good portion of this difference can be attributed to the use of finer income 
categorizations in the 1980 Census, rather than any true difference in the variance of income 
distributions across counties.  The impact of a one-standard-deviation increase in income 
homogeneity on support for Carter, based on the fixed effects specification in the table’s last 
column, is a decline of 1 percentage point – nearly identical to the effect size indicated by the 
equivalent specification in Table 4.
25
6. Conclusions
Thomas Frank’s popular book What’s the Matter With Kansas posits that the Republican 
party has effectively convinced working-class Americans to vote against their economic self-
interest.  Up to this point, the best explanation available in the economic literature for the same 
phenomenon rests on an untenable hypothesis – that Kansans have higher expectations for 
upward income mobility than other voters, even though the income distribution in that state is 
decidedly compact.  This paper offers a new explanation for voting patterns in late-twentieth 
century America, inspired by an established yet growing body of research identifying relative 
consumption as an important determinant of individual well-being.  The model developed in this 
paper, empirically supported by county and individual-level empirical evidence on voting 
patterns in 1980 and 2000, suggests that low- and moderate-income voters are less supportive of 
redistribution when they evaluate their well-being by comparing themselves to other low-income 
households.  High-income voters also appear to support redistribution more fervently when 
residing in heterogeneous communities, possibly because exposure to the poor breeds either true 
25 In an unreported specification matching that used in the third column of Table 5, the 1980 data reveal a 
continued tendency for moderate-income voters to be more supportive of Democratic candidates as the 
population shifts from lower- to higher-income voters.
30altruism or a self-interested desire to appease the masses.
Can this relativistic view of economic self-interest truly explain what a social scientist 
might term the “Kansas effect?”  Table 9 provides some insight as to the relative explanatory 
power of income homogeneity and voters’ position in the income distribution.  The table begins 
by listing actual Democrat vote shares for each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia. 
The second column shows a predicted value for each state based on a county-level regression 
controlling for exactly five variables: the low- and middle-income shares as defined in Table 4, 
the low-income group share squared, an interaction between the low- and middle-income shares, 
and an interaction between the middle- and high-income shares.
26  The third column indicates 
whether this prediction correctly forecasts the winner of the state's electoral votes in 2000.  The 
third column shows the proportion of the state’s deviation from the national average that can be 
explained by this simple model.  This parsimonious model generates correct predictions in 34 of 
51 states, including Kansas.
.  For comparative purposes, the final column reports the predicted values from a more 
complete regression that adds the additional control variables employed in Table 4.  The 
predicted values listed in boldface type show situations where the complete model corrects an 
erroneous forecast made by the simple model.  There are seven such instances, of a possible 
seventeen, almost entirely in Southern states.  Of the remaining ten states, nine supported Gore in 
spite of predictions to the contrary: these are states with a progressive reputation including 
Minnesota, Oregon, and Vermont.  The model thus suggests that a book title with greater support 
from a political economy model would be “What's the matter with Maine?”
Ex-post political prognostication aside, these results also provide further evidence to 
26 This regression is weighted by the number of votes cast in the election.
31support prior theoretical work on the optimal structure of taxation, expenditure, and 
redistributive policy when relative consumption, or an individual’s position in the consumption 
distribution, determines an individual’s subjective well-being.  Further research on the nature of 
such relative preferences may play an important role both in the design of superior policies, and 
the production of more preferable policy platforms.  For example, a finding that absolute 
consumption is a primary determinant of utility up to some subsistence level would suggest a 
rational ceiling for transfer levels.  The more exact determination of individuals’ reference 
groups, and the discovery of means of changing those reference groups, could yield important 
insights regarding methods of improving individuals’ perceptions of their own well-being with 
minimal cost outlays.  Of course, paternalistic arguments in favor of traditional policies can 
always be made in opposition to considerations of relativity in utility functions.  History 
suggests, however, that the candidate who can offer the most appealing menu of policies to the 
greatest share of voters will have a natural advantage in getting those policies enacted.
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35Table 1: Examples derived from the theoretical model
Population γ Median voter's 
reference person
Median voter's optimal 
β
0,0,1 --- --- 1/2
0,1,1 --- --- 1
0,1,2 --- --- 5/7
0,0,1 0≤γ<1 0 1/2
0,0,1 1 0 0≤β≤1
0,0,1 0 1 1/2
0,0,1 1/2 1 1/5
0,0,1 1 1 0
0,1,2 1/2 2 5/16
0,1,2 1/2 0 1
36Table 2: County-level summary statistics, 2000 dataset (N=3,113)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Gore’s share of two-party vote 0.502 0.132 0.069 0.905
Income homogeneity index 0.079 0.007 0.069 0.235
Percent Black 0.117 0.130 0 0.861
Percent Asian 0.033 0.047 0 0.462
Percent American Indian 0.008 0.027 0 0.937
Percent Pacific Islander 0.001 0.006 0 0.109
Percent Other Race 0.046 0.060 0 0.398
Percent Multiracial 0.024 0.018 0 0.293
Percent Hispanic 0.105 0.134 0 0.981
Racial homogeneity index 0.663 0.188 0.266 1
Percent of housing built in past 10 
years
0.326 0.149 0.049 0.870
Owner-occupancy rate 0.673 0.108 0.195 0.895
Percent single-family detached houses 0.613 0.142 0.003 0.942
Percent of households residing in 
same house five years ago
0.545 0.072 0.154 0.806
Percent employed in manufacturing 0.142 0.070 0 0.486
Percent employed by government 0.149 0.050 0.061 0.691
Percent active-duty military 0.005 0.016 0 0.617
Percent of households with incomes 
below $24,999
0.359 0.097 0.061 0.692
Percent of households with incomes 
between $25,000 and $74,999
0.501 0.054 0.274 0.648
Note: Unit of observation is the county or county-equivalent; observations are weighted by 
votes cast in the 2000 Presidential election.
37Table 3: Summary statistics for individual-level regression covariates (N=1,287)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Income between $30k and $75k 0.518 --- 0 1
Income over $75k 0.250 --- 0 1
Own income group's share in 
county of residence
0.378 0.103 0.050 0.737
Share in lower income categories in 
county of residence
0.254 0.231 0 0.823
Share in higher income categories 
in county of residence
0.368 0.271 0 0.950
Black 0.087 --- 0 1
Asian 0.012 --- 0 1
Other race 0.036 --- 0 1
High school graduate 0.056 --- 0 1
Some college 0.246 --- 0 1
College graduate 0.255 --- 0 1
Postgraduate education 0.155 --- 0 1
Widowed 0.096 --- 0 1
Divorced 0.132 --- 0 1
Separated 0.015 --- 0 1
Never married 0.160 --- 0 1
Children present in household 0.383 --- 0 1
Female 0.596 --- 0 1
Voted for Gore in 2000 election 0.485 --- 0 1
Note: Unit of observation is the individual voter.  Data sources are CBS/New York Times polls 
taken in November and December 2000, ICPSR studies #3231 and 3238.
38Table 4: Basic regression results, 2000 data
Independent variable Dependent variable: Gore’s share of the two-party vote




















































































































Percent with incomes $25,000-
$74,999




Detailed income categorizations? No Yes Yes No No
State fixed effects? No No No No Yes
N 3,113 3,113 3,113 3,113 3,113
R
2 0.011 0.402 0.682 0.672 0.786
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  Unit of observation is the county or county equivalent; observations are 
weighted by number of votes cast in the 2000 presidential election.
39Table 5: Testing for heterogeneity in the effect of homogeneity
Independent variable
Dependent variable: 
Gore’s share of the two-party vote
Income homogeneity index 0.084
(0.423)
— ---
Income homogeneity* percent urban -2.11
(0.527)
— ---
















“Middle” income group share squared — 1.407
(0.464)
---
“High” income group share squared — -1.104
(0.170)
---








Table 2, last column controls (incl. State FE) Yes Yes Yes
N 3,113 3,113 3,113
R
2 0.787 0.789 0.789
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  Unit of observation is the county or county equivalent; 
observations are weighted by number of votes cast in the 2000 presidential election.
40Table 6: Addressing the potential for endogenous sorting
Independent variable Dependent variable: Gore’s share of the two-party vote
Income homogeneity index, 












Detailed income categories? No Yes Yes No No
Additional community 
covariates?
No No Yes Yes Yes
Basic income categories? No No No Yes Yes
State fixed effects? No No No No Yes
N 3,103 3,103 3,103 3,103 3,103
R
2 0.005 0.388 0.682 0.672 0.786
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  Unit of observation is the county or county equivalent; 
observations are weighted by number of votes cast in the 2000 presidential election.
41Table 7: Estimating the model with individual-level data
Independent Variable Dependent variable: Individual voted for Gore in 2000 election

























































































Community-level characteristics No No No Yes
N 1,278 1,278 1,278 1,278
R
2 0.038 0.040 0.169 0.180
Note: Estimates are derived from linear probability models.  Standard errors in parentheses.  Community-level 
characteristics include share of respondent's race, percent employed in manufacturing industries, percent single-
family detached houses, percent of housing built in the past ten years, percent urban, percent owner-occupied, 
percent residing in the same house five years ago, percent civilian government employees, percent employed in the 
armed forces.
42Table 8: Basic regression results, 1980 data
Independent variable Dependent variable: Carter’s share of the two-party vote














































































































Percent with incomes $5,000-
39,999




Detailed income categorizations? No Yes Yes No No
State fixed effects? No No No No Yes
N 3,104 3,104 3,102 3,102 3,102
R
2 0.004 0.275 0.455 0.428 0.598
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  Unit of observation is the county or county equivalent; observations are 
weighted by number of votes cast in the 2000 presidential election.
43Table 9: Can the “new” economic self-interest model explain support for Gore in 2000?
State Actual value Value predicted by basic income 
category model
Correct prediction? Value predicted by full model 
Alabama 42.5 51.5 No 46.4
Arkansas 47.2 45.7 Yes 40.9
Arizona 47.5 49.0 Yes 42.1
California 56.4 57.3 Yes 56.6
Colorado 45.5 45.8 Yes 44.4
Connecticut 59.3 59.0 Yes 56.4
District of Columbia 90.5 70.5 Yes 92.2
Delaware 56.9 49.4 No 50.8
Florida 49.998 50.1 No 48.4
Georgia 44.0 49.1 Yes 44.8
Hawaii 59.8 54.6 Yes 63.7
Iowa 50.2 41.6 No 43.7
Idaho 29.1 42.4 Yes 40.3
Illinois 56.2 50.0 Yes 53.7
Indiana 42.0 45.1 Yes 44.4
Kansas 38.9 42.2 Yes 44.3
Kentucky 42.3 49.8 Yes 43.4
Louisiana 46.1 54.4 No 52.0
Massachusetts 64.7 59.2 Yes 59.3
Maryland 58.5 46.6 No 57.9
Maine 52.7 44.3 No 43.8
Michigan 52.4 50.5 Yes 51.1
44Table 9: Can the “new” economic self-interest model explain support for Gore in 2000?
State Actual value Value predicted by basic income 
category model
Correct prediction? Value predicted by full model 
Minnesota 51.3 44.4 No 47.3
Missouri 48.3 44.8 Yes 44.8
Mississippi 41.3 50.1 No 47.0
Montana 36.4 42.9 Yes 43.2
North Carolina 43.6 46.8 Yes 42.0
North Dakota 35.3 41.1 Yes 44.2
Nebraska 34.5 42.3 Yes 43.0
New Hampshire 49.3 45.9 Yes 46.3
New Jersey 58.1 57.1 Yes 59.6
New Mexico 50.0 49.8 No 46.8
Nevada 48.1 46.8 Yes 41.5
New York 62.8 58.5 Yes 64.1
Ohio 48.0 48.2 Yes 49.3
Oklahoma 38.9 47.0 Yes 49.2
Oregon 50.2 46.1 No 46.6
Pennsylvania 52.1 48.6 No 54.4
Rhode Island 65.6 55.2 Yes 56.7
South Carolina 41.8 48.4 Yes 45.6
South Dakota 38.4 40.9 Yes 42.5
Tennessee 48.1 47.8 Yes 43.5
Texas 39.0 51.3 No 43.8
Utah 28.3 42.2 Yes 38.9
45Table 9: Can the “new” economic self-interest model explain support for Gore in 2000?
State Actual value Value predicted by basic income 
category model
Correct prediction? Value predicted by full model 
Virginia 45.8 43.6 Yes 46.6
Vermont 55.4 44.6 No 45.1
Washington 52.8 47.8 No 48.3
Wisconsin 50.1 42.9 No 46.2
West Virginia 46.7 48.5 Yes 44.6
Wyoming 29.0 43.6 Yes 44.1
Note: Predictions are based on county-level regressions employing number of votes cast in the 2000 election as weights.
46Figure 1: Income inequality and voting patterns, 1896-2004
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Median Income in 1999Figure 3: Responses to “Large differences in income are necessary for America's prosperity,” General Social Survey
49Figure 4: Support for redistribution across the income distribution when individuals define 
reference groups as symmetric income bands.
50Figure 5: The income distribution in the United States, 1940-2000.  Densities omit famlies with 
nonpositive income and the top 1% of the distribution in each year.  The 1940 density uses 
family wage and salary income rather than total family income.  Dollar values are not inflation-




































Dollar values have been rescaled to give all densities common support.